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Abstract
American cities devote significant resources to the implementation of traffic safety countermeasures that
prevent pedestrian fatalities. However, the before-after comparisons typically used to evaluate the success
of these countermeasures often suffer from selection bias. This paper motivates the tendency for selection
bias to overestimate the benefits of traffic safety policy, using New York City’s Vision Zero strategy as an
example. The NASS General Estimates System, Fatality Analysis Reporting System and other databases
are combined into a Bayesian hierarchical model to calculate a more realistic before-after comparison. The
results confirm the before-after analysis of New York City’s Vision Zero policy did in fact overestimate the
effect of the policy, and a more realistic estimate is roughly two-thirds the size.
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1. Introduction
Researchers cite motor vehicle collisions as a leading source of preventable death in the United States
(Mokdad et al. 2004). Thirty-five thousand Americans were killed by motor vehicles in 2013. That exceeds the
number of fatalities by more controversial causes such as firearms (thirty-four thousand deaths) and alcohol
(twenty-nine thousand deaths) (Xu et al. 2016). Yet gun and alcohol related deaths receive a significantly
larger portion of the public’s attention.
The difference between collisions and guns or alcohol is that policymakers have historically considered
collisions unavoidable. Traditional road design manuals explicitly recognized a tradeoff between safety and
mobility. Engineers were instructed to build roads to accommodate the projected traffic volume and reduce
bottlenecks. For example, urban arterials were designed to achieve a traffic flow of 30 to 60 miles per hour
(mph) (Aashto 2001). Policymakers then set speed limits to the 85th percentile speed of drivers observed
in favorable operating conditions. This speed was thought to offer a reasonable balance between safety
and mobility, and drivers were expected to reduce their speed only when unfavorable operating conditions
produced increased risk (National Research Council (US). Transportation Research Board and Limits 1998).
An increasing number of American cities have found the traditional approach inadequate. Urban drivers
are too often found unresponsive to the conditions that put more vulnerable road users, like pedestrians, at
increased risk. In 2014, fifteen percent of motor vehicle fatalities were pedestrians, and seventy-eight percent
of these occurred in urban areas (Administration 2016). Twelve major American cities have since established
comprehensive strategies that compel drivers to make safer decisions: Chicago, San Francisco, New York
City, Boston, Los Angeles, Austin, Portland, Seattle, San Jose, San Diego, Washington D.C. and Denver.
These strategies are collectively known as Vision Zero and have a stated goal of creating a road system with
zero traffic fatalities.
The term Vision Zero is not mere rhetoric. It refers to a specific, long-term infrastructure investment strategy
that rejects the traditional balance between safety and mobility. Vision Zero prioritizes safety over mobility
by anticipating human error and then slowing vehicles to the safest feasible travel speed. Success is assured by
physics: slower vehicles collide with less force and are less likely to kill a pedestrian. For this reason, citywide
road redesign that physically slows vehicles is the basis of Vision Zero as originally conceived (Tingvall and
Haworth 2000).
Although effective in theory, a complete redesign of roads has proven challenging to implement and sustain
across an entire city. A pragmatic albeit less assured approach is to adopt countermeasures that encourage
vehicles to reduce their speed. For example, cities often install signs, improve lighting and visibility of cross
walks or direct police officers to prioritize enforcement of the traffic law. These countermeasures are effective
when drivers behave as though the road had been redesigned. Needless to say encouragements without
commensurate levels of design may not prevent fatalities if drivers have little incentive to change their speed
in compliance.
Consider the posted speed limit. Vision Zero cities frequently encourage vehicles to reduce their speed by
lowering the limit below the speed for which the road was originally designed. Such speed limit reductions
are common because they can be implemented immediately and at relatively little cost, and the reduction
ostensibly affects every road across an entire city (Leaf and Preusser 1999). However, the National Highway
Safety Traffic Administration rates the countermeasure “reduce and enforce speed limits” only three out of
five stars for improving safety because research indicates that actual vehicle speed declines by only a fraction
of the reduced limit, typically 1-2 mph for every 5 mph reduced. It states that effectiveness requires the
reduced limit be met with communications and outreach, enforcement and engineering changes (Goodwin et
al. 2010).
Nevertheless, traffic safety advocates promised American cities reductions in fatalities when countermeasures
are combined as part of a larger Vision Zero strategy. Many cited European countries like Sweden, which
pioneered the Vision Zero movement in the mid-1990s (Government Offices of Sweden and Investment Council,
n.d.). Sweden took steps such as reducing the posted speed limit, separating traffic lanes and erecting barriers.
Fatalities fell 28 percent, from 6 to 4.7 deaths per 100,000 residents (Johansson 2009); meanwhile, the United
States experienced 11 deaths per 100,000 residents in 2013. The advocates reasoned that American cities
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were capable of preventing a considerable number of fatalities by emulating Sweden. The policy question is
whether pedestrian fatalities have been prevented by the Vision Zero strategies of major American cities, and
if so, how many.
This paper demonstrates the utility of a hierarchical Bayes approach to address this question. The demonstra-
tion is arranged as follows. Section 2 establishes the major methodological problem that arises in evaluating
the effect of Vision Zero strategies. The decision of which roads to select for the policy produces before-after
comparisons that typically exaggerate the number of fatalities prevented, and New York City’s Vision Zero
road prioritization strategy provides a real world example.
Section 3 reviews how selection bias is corrected by replacing the outcomes in the before period with their
estimated expectation. A nonparametric empirical Bayes approach is mathematically appealing because
it places no restrictions on how the expected number of fatalities varies across roads. But an empirical
application overcorrects the before-after comparison, underestimating the effect of New York City’s Vision
Zero strategy. A more realistic estimate requires additional data on road characteristics. Much traffic safety
data is collected retrospectively, imposing sparsity and multicollinearity among the characteristics of the
relatively small subset of roads actually observed. A hierarchical Bayes approach is proposed as a favorable
alternative capable of handling these complications.
In Section 4, a hierarchical Bayes analysis is performed using data from the twelve major American cities that
have established Vision Zero strategies. The posterior distributions of the model parameters are interpreted,
and a brief discussion is highlighted. The results are then applied to the New York City example introduced
in Section 2. It suggests the number of fatalities prevented from New York City’s strategy is two-thirds
the amount implied by the before-after comparison. The paper then concludes in Section 5 with some final
thoughts about the evaluation of Vision Zero policies.
2. Identifying Selection Bias in Before-After Analyses of Vision Zero Policies
Before-after comparisons are commonly used to evaluate traffic safety policies. A before-after comparison
examines an outcome before and after the implementation of a policy and attributes any change to the policy.
The comparison can be made in a number of ways. Popular with traffic safety researchers are modification
factors, which calculate the ratio of the outcome after the policy to the outcome before. The AASHTO
Highway Safety Manual uses modification factors to evaluate policy. This analysis considers the reduction
factor, which calculates the difference between the before and after outcomes. Policymakers largely consult
this measure.
Selection bias refers to the systematic misrepresentation of a policy that occurs when atypical units are
chosen for the policy. This misrepresentation arises in a variety of contexts, but it is particularly common
in before-after comparisons when triage is used to select units in lieu of randomization—the standard of
experimental research. Since random selection is infeasible for large-scale traffic safety policies like Vision
Zero, before-after comparisons misrepresent the number of fatalities that were actually prevented as a result
of a Vision Zero strategy.
The statement that a Vision Zero strategy prevented fatalities is understood to concern the causal effect of
the strategy on the roads selected for the strategy after implementation of the strategy. For the selected roads,
the policymaker directly observes the number of fatalities after implementation. However, the policymaker
does not observe the number of fatalities that would have occurred had those roads not been selected for the
strategy. The main assumption of the before-after comparison is that the before period reflects this unobserved
outcome so that comparison with the after period captures the effect of the strategy as implemented.
This section demonstrates how the assumption is violated when policymakers select roads based on the
number of fatalities in the before period. The fatalities considered “prevented” by the before-after comparison
will not replicate in future years when the same policy is expanded to include roads with typical levels of
fatalities in the before period. For this reason, the before-after comparison constitutes a tenuous basis for
setting policy. Subsection 2.1 illustrates a scenario in which selection bias arises. Although perhaps simplistic,
3
the scenario is useful for introducing the diagnostic and correction strategy used in the remaining analysis.
Subsection 2.2 provides a real world example.
2.1 Selection bias results in before-after comparisons that typically overestimate the benefits
of traffic safety policy
In practice, triage leads to the selection of roads with an atypically large number of fatalities in the before
period. This causes before-after comparisons to overestimate the number of fatalities that would subsequently
occur had the strategy never been applied. The number of fatalities is atypically large because selection favors
roads with fatalities determined in part by erratic fluctuations that are unlikely to repeat themselves. It is
the transient nature of these fluctuations that result in fewer fatalities on the selected roads in subsequent
periods. Any decrease between the before and after periods is then partially an artifact of the selection
process, and this artificial portion is often referred to as the regression to the mean or simply the regression
effect (Freedman, Pisani, and Purves 1998).
Among statistical artifacts, the regression effect is particularly pernicious in that large decreases in fatalities
can occur on roads even when a policy has no effect whatsoever, and it is difficult to assess the extent to
which a decrease is an artifact of the selection process without knowing the population from which the roads
were selected. The population affords the context necessary for determining how atypical the selected roads
are, as illustrated with the following scenario.
Consider the following fictional city in which there are one hundred roads. Assume that in any year, each
road independently experiences one fatality with a probability of ten percent and no fatalities otherwise.
Policymakers would expect ten of the hundred roads to have fatalities. Suppose that ten roads did in fact
experience a fatality.
If the city selected these ten roads for study, but it did not implement any actual policy changes, there would
be one fatality per road on the selected roads in the before period. Yet, only one of the selected roads would
be expected to have a fatality in a subsequent after period. Suppose again that this is the case. The reduction
factor on selected roads would show a ninety percent decline in fatalities, from one hundred to ten percent,
even though no policy changes were made. The selected roads have “regressed” towards the mean.
That selection accounts for this decrease can be demonstrated by calculating the reduction factor on the
remaining ninety, unselected roads. This will mirror the selected roads by “regressing” up towards the mean
since if the selected roads were atypical in consisting of roads of exaggerated danger, the remaining unselected
roads would consist of roads of exaggerated safety. Indeed, the remaining ninety roads are expected to
increase in fatalities from zero to ten percent.
Readers familiar with causal inference might recognize selection bias as a violation of the unconfoundedness
assumption, and the “mirror image” diagnostic in the previous paragraph as estimating the effect on pseudo
outcomes (Imbens and Rubin 2015) or control outcomes (Rosenbaum 2017). To see this, let Bs (As) denote
the observed number of fatalities on the selected roads in the before period (after period). Let Bu (Au)
denote the number of fatalities that would have been observed on the selected roads in the before period
(after period) had they not been selected. Then the before-after comparison, As −Bs, can be decomposed as
follows:
As −Bs = (As −Au) + (Au −Bu) + (Bu −Bs)
The first quantity, (As − Au), is the causal effect of the policy as defined in the beginning of this section.
The before-after comparison represents the causal effect when both baselines (Au −Bu) and (Bu −Bs) are
zero. The first baseline reflects temporal stability. If zero, the number of fatalities would not have changed
between periods had the selected roads not been selected. The second baseline reflects selection stability.
If zero, the number of fatalities in the before period would not have been different had the selected roads
not been selected. Selecting the roads with a large number of fatalities in the before period means Bs is
atypically large and Bu is atypically small. It follows that (Bu −Bs) < 0 and (Au −Bu) > 0.
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In the fictional city described above, it is observed that Bs = 10 and As = 1. In practice, Bu and Au are not
observed. However, it can be surmised that Au = As = 1, since the policy did nothing, and Bu = 0, since all
roads with fatalities were selected. Therefore, As −Bs = −9, As −Au = 0, Bu −Bs = −10 and Au −Bu = 1.
This last quantity accounts for the “mirror image” diagnostic. All roads are comparable in the before period
because the fatality rate is assumed to follow the same distribution for all roads. The roads not selected
for study by the fictional city represent what the selected roads would have looked like had they not been
selected.
One way to adjust for selection bias is to replace the before outcomes with the average outcome across all
roads in the before period. In the fictional city described above, the average number of fatalities in the before
period is ten percent. The before-after comparison of ten percent to ten percent gives the correct answer
for both selected and unselected roads: no fatalities were prevented in this fictional city, and the observed
decline is an artifact of the selection process.
This adjustment requires the expected number of fatalities to be the same across selected and unselected
roads in the before period. Otherwise the average will not adequately reflect the future number of fatalities
under the conditions of the before period. A model is often used to account for the disparity between the
selected and unselected roads. In fact, the regression model derives its name from its description of the
regression effect (Stigler 2016).
2.2 Before-after comparison overestimates the effect of New York City’s Vision Zero Strategy
The real world example is a before-after comparison used to evaluate New York City’s Vision Zero strategy. In
November 2014, New York City’s Vision Zero Committee reviewed the location of traffic fatalities and serious
injuries between the years 2009 and 2013. In 2015, these locations were prioritized for Vision Zero engineering,
enforcement and education countermeasures. A question facing the Committee was how many pedestrian
fatalities were prevented in 2016 as a result of the changes on these roads (Taskforce 2017). Throughout this
analysis, the term “fatalities” refers to pedestrian fatalities.
Using the road shapefile provided by the New York State GIS Program Office, it is estimated that 44,337 road
segments, about thirty-two percent of New York City road segments, were selected for prioritization. These
road segments made up roughly seventy percent of pedestrian fatalities between 2009-2013. The priority
locations are visualized for midtown Manhattan in Figure 1. The blue shaded region is the priority area, the
blue lines are priority corridors and the blue triangles are priority intersections. Blue dots depict fatalities
falling within priority locations. Red dots depict fatalities falling outside priority locations. Fatalities are
displayed in the first panel of Figure 1 for the last year of the review period, 2013, and in the second panel of
Figure 1 for the year 2016.
As outlined in Subsection 2.1, a decline in fatalities is expected among the roads selected for prioritization
since the selection criteria favored locations with fatalities in the before period. In fact, a sizeable reduction
was observed and is displayed in the first panel of Figure 2. Over the 2009-2013 period, an average of 99
pedestrian fatalities occurred at priority locations throughout the city each year. In 2016, there were only 72
fatalities at these locations, a 27 percent decline. The committee’s question could be rephrased as asking
what portion of the observed reduction was deaths prevented by New York City’s policy change and what
portion was an artifact of the selection process.
Without additional analysis, any division of the observed reduction between actual prevention and selection
bias is possible. On one hand, the 27 percent decline is nearly equivalent to the reduction experienced by
Sweden after its implementation of Vision Zero. Moreover, a simple thought experiment using results from
the traffic safety literature explains how this decline might have been achieved in New York City.
Recall, the basis of Vision Zero is the prioritization of safety by reducing vehicle speed. As part of its strategy,
New York City lowered the default speed limit from 30 to 25 mph. Suppose for simplicity all vehicles traveled
uniformly at 30 mph before the City reduced its speed limit. A 5mph reduction of the speed limit typically
reduces vehicle speeds by 1-2 mph so assuming every priority road achieved a 2 mph reduction in vehicle
speeds, a new speed limit of 25 mph would correspond with vehicle speeds of 28 mph. According to the
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Midtown Manhattan road segments selected for prioritization by New York City Vision Zero
Figure 1: This figure displays the locations of pedestrian fatalities in mid-Manhattan for the last year (2013)
of the before period (2009-2013) and the after period (2016). Priority corridors are colored blue, priority
intersections are triangled and priority zones are shaded blue. Fatalities in priority locations are represented
by blue dots, while fatalities outside of priority locations are represented by red dots.
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regression analysis of Rosén and Sander (2009), this 2 mph change in vehicle speed would produce a fatality
reduction of 24 percent, three percentage points less than the reduction suggested by the before-after analysis.
Attributing New York City’s 27 percent reduction entirely to the Vision Zero Strategy would therefore be
possible if subsequent countermeasures, such as engineering changes, education and enforcement, led to above
average compliance with the posted speed limit.
On the other hand, the second panel in Figure 2 suggests a large portion of the 27 percent reduction in
fatalities is driven by selection. It shows that from the 2009-2013 before period to the 2016 after period,
fatalities at non priority locations increased 20 percent, almost the same magnitude as fatalities in priority
locations decreased. It is implausible that the strategy caused a substantial number of fatalities on non
priority roads. Instead, the mirror image behavior in Figure 2 is evidence the procedure used to select priority
roads accounts for a nontrivial portion of the observed reduction in the number of fatalities.
The portion of the observed reduction due to prevention can be separated from the portion due to selection
by replacing the before values with their expectations as mentioned in Subsection 2.1. However, the sample
average will not work in this example because the expected number of fatalities is not the same across
selected and unselected roads in the before period. Dangerous roads were more likely to be selected. A more
sophisticated approach is necessary to estimate the expectation, and this discussion is the subject of Section
3.
An increase in fatalities on unselected roads contemporaneous with a decrease on selected road indicates selection bias
Figure 2: This figure displays the number of pedestrian fatalities in New York City in the before and after
periods for both priority and non priority roads. The roads selected for priority changes experienced a 27
percent drop in fatalities from an average of 99 over the 2009-2013 time period to 72 in 2016. However,
fatalities on the remaining, non priority roads increased 20 percent. This mirror image behavior is evidence
of selection bias.
3. Correcting Selection Bias in Before-After Analyses of Vision Zero Policies
Section 2 demonstrates how before-after comparisons exaggerate the benefit of a Vision Zero strategy when
roads are selected based on the number of fatalities in the before period. The before period no longer
reflects the number of fatalities one would expect in future periods had the selected roads not been selected.
The before-after comparison is corrected by replacing the number of fatalities in the before period with its
expectation, provided no significant change occurs between the before and after periods other than the policy.
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The expectation is estimable by jointly modeling the number of fatalities on the selected roads with the
number of fatalities on the remaining, unselected roads.
This Section develops a model to estimate this expectation. A nonparametric empirical Bayes analysis serves
as a mathematically appealing starting point because it places no restrictions on how the expected number of
fatalities might vary by road. Subsection 3.1 adjusts the before-after comparison using Robbins’ Formula.
However, an application to New York City data underestimates the effect of the Vision Zero strategy. A more
realistic adjustment is obtained by incorporating additional information on roads. Subsection 3.2 presents a
hierarchical Bayes regression model that allows for a large number of covariates. The model is modified to
reflect the retrospective collection of important traffic safety data.
3.1 A Nonparametric Empirical Bayes Approach Without Informative Covariates Overcorrects
for Selection Bias
Recognition of the regression effect and selection bias more broadly lies at the foundation of modern statistical
practice, established more than a century ago (Stigler 2016). Traffic fatalities, along with students’ test
scores and parent/children heights, have long served as the prime examples. Despite this history, it remains
perhaps the most common pitfall in the statistical analysis of data (Friedman 1992). It is no surprise then
that multiple corrections have been offered. Among the most famous is Herbert Robbins’, who considered the
exact problem of selection bias in before-after studies (Robbins and Zhang 1988), and provides a principled
starting point.
The outcome in the before period is described by the following hierarchical model. See Gelman and Hill
(2006) for an introduction to hierarchical models and the accompanying notation:
Xi ∼ Poisson(µi)
µi ∼ g(θ)
In the context of a Vision Zero strategy, Xi denotes the number of pedestrian fatalities that might occur
on road i in the before period, i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. The rate parameter of each road, µi, is thought exchangeable
and modeled i.i.d. g(θ). The hierarchy is interpreted as describing how roads are constructed from a super
population of roads that a city could build. From this perspective, the Bayes moniker is somewhat of a
misnomer. The interpretation is closer to the random effects models of classical statistics than a full Bayes
analysis. See Berger (2013) for a discussion of this distinction.
Let Is < I be the number of selected roads. After observing the number of fatalities in the before period, the
number of fatalities expected on these road had they not been selected is E(
∑Is
i=1 µi|Xi) =
∑Is
i=1E(µi|Xi).
Each E(µi|Xi) is estimable under the above model using Robbins’ Formula (Efron and Hastie 2016):
Eˆ(µi|Xi = x) = (x+ 1)
∑I
i′=1 1(Xi′ = x+ 1)∑I
i′=1 1(Xi′ = x)
Note that index i′ ranges over all roads, I, both selected and not selected. This estimate is considered to be
a more realistic characterization of µi than the road-specific mean, Xi.
The Formula has a long history. Alan Turing originally proposed it as a solution to the related Missing
Species Problem (Good 1953), but it was named after Herbert Robbins, who studied its properties extensively
(Robbins 1955, Robbins and Zhang 2000). Its appeal comes primarily from the fact that no restrictions are
placed on the population distribution, g(θ). That is, the estimate is derived without any restriction on how
the expected number of fatalities might vary across each road.
Table 1 applies Robbins’ formula to the New York City data from Subsection 2.2. The first row, <1> displays
the total number of road segments in New York City by the number of fatalities between 2009 and 2013. For
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example, there were 138,142 segments with no fatalities, 632 with one fatality and so on. These were plugged
into Robbins’ Formula to get <2>, the expected number of fatalities on each road segment had it not been
selected, having observed the number of fatalities in the before period. This was then multiplied by <3>, the
number of road segments selected by the Vision Zero Committee as priority locations, yielding <4>, the
number of fatalities on priority road segments expected over a five year period if not selected. Summing and
dividing by the number of years in the 2009-2013 period gives an average of 52 deaths. Thus despite observing
an average of 99 deaths per year in priority locations over the 2009-2013 period, adjustment with Robbins’
Formula suggests only 52 fatalities are to be expected in the following year absent any policy change.
Note that the estimated fatality rate is lower for road segments with two fatalities than roads with one
fatality. This is a known consequence of the Formula (Efron and Hastie 2016). While there are several
possible corrections, road segments with two or more fatalities are sufficiently rare that adjustments to the
estimated fatality rate do not significantly change the end result.
The expectation of 52 fatalities per year at the priority locations is substantially lower than the 72 fatalities
actually observed in 2016 after the implementation of Vision Zero. If the adjustment is to be believed, more
fatalities have occurred at priority locations than would be expected had the previous policy been maintained,
not less, as suggested by the before-after comparison. Moreover, the increase is considerable. The percent
increase in the number of fatalities as a result of the policy is estimated to be 38 percent.
Yet this 38 percent increase is potentially more pessimistic than a 27 percent decrease is optimistic. Nothing
in the traffic safety literature implies that the countermeasures deployed would substantially increase the
number of fatalities. While the before-after comparison failed to account for the fact that many non priority
road segments were eligible for selection, Robbins’ Formula overcorrects by too readily comparing fatalities
across priority and non priority road segments.
Additional criteria factored into the selection process, and a portion of the non priority road segments have
characteristics that make them unlikely to experience a fatality and be selected. For example, Figure 1
suggests that road segments on the periphery of New York City were not prioritized, and perhaps the fatalities
on these road segments should not be compared directly with the priority road segments that were selected.
Doing so might make the priority road segments appear more atypical in the before period than they really
are.
Generally speaking, road characteristics, such as the number of lanes or the existence of a protective median,
inform a Vision Zero selection process and influence the fatality rate. These characteristics will be distributed
disproportionately across selected and unselected roads. Inclusion of this information into a model ensures
that the fatalities on the large, four lane roads with a protective median likely to be selected are not compared
directly to the fatalities on the small one way roads unlikely to be selected. The better comparisons are
made in the before period, the closer the estimated fatality rate in the before period represents what would
have happened had a road not been selected, and the more accurate the estimated effect of the Vision Zero
strategy.
Fortunately, a vast quantity of traffic safety data is available to identify similar roads. This data can be used
to stratify roads into different types so that a more realistic estimate of the expected number of fatalities can
be made for each road type. Subsection 3.2 discusses the general, methodological complications that arise
when incorporating traffic safety data into the approach of this section. Section 4 considers data-specific
complications.
Table 1: Application of Robbins’ Formula to the New York City
Vision Zero data
Observed Number of Fatalities 0 1 2 3
<1> Number of Road Segments 138,142 632 40 1
<2> Estimated Fatality Rate .0045 .1266 .075 4
<3> Number of Priority Segments 43,806 405 29 1
<4> Expected Number of Fatalities 200 51 2 4
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3.2 A Hierarchical Bayes Approach Allows for Covariates Informative of Selection
The empirical Bayes analysis performed in Subsection 3.1 could be salvaged were the selection process for a
Vision Zero strategy known to depend on a few observable factors. The data could be stratified by the factors,
and an estimate could be made for the roads in each stratum. The remaining determinants of fatalities would
be evenly distributed among roads within strata, allowing for a fair comparison of selected and unselected
roads. Unfortunately, the selection process depends on a large number of factors and, while several databases
are available to measure them, doing so introduces additional complications that preclude an empirical Bayes
approach.
A hierarchical Bayes analysis can be viewed as an approximation of the nonparametric empirical Bayes
approach from Subsection 3.1 that allows covariate information to inform the population distribution, g(θ).
Hierarchical Bayes compares favorably with nonparametric empirical Bayes, even without covariates. See
Efron and Hastie (2016) and Berger (2013) for a comparison of the methods in general and Robbins’ Formula
specifically.
Suppose traffic safety experts classified each of i ∈ {1, . . . , I} roads into one of J types. Let j[i] denote the
type of the ith road, j[i] ∈ {1, . . . , J}. A univariate hierarchical Bayes log-linear regression model describing
fatalities in the before period can be written:
Xi ∼ Poisson(µi)
µi = exp(λj[i])
λj ∼ Normal(θ, σ)
As in Subsection 3.1, Xi denotes the number of fatalities on road i in the before period. However, the log-rate
parameter for each road type, λj , is thought exchangeable and modeled i.i.d. Normal(θ, σ). The hierarchy is
still interpreted as describing how roads are themselves chosen from a super population of roads that a city
could build.
If the normal distribution were replaced with the arbitrary distribution, g(θ), Robbins’ Formula could be
calculated within covariate stratum as in Subsection 3.1. In fact, were experts able to easily classify all roads
into one of J types, a number of empirical Bayes approaches would be possible. The negative binomial model
is common in the traffic safety literature (Hauer 2005), where, in its simplest case, fatalities are assumed to
follow a Gamma mixture of Poissons, and the hyperparameters are estimated from the data. In fact, the
original application of the negative binomial was to model accident statistics (Greenwood and Yule 1920).
However, it will be the case that road types are themselves divisible into a large number of subtypes, and roads
sharing multiple subtypes are more similar than roads sharing fewer subtypes. The univariate hierarchical
Bayes log-linear regression model is easily extended to this multivariate case, although the notation established
in this subsection must be augmented. Suppose traffic safety experts classified each road, i, into one of
jk ∈ {1, . . . , Jk} subtypes for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} groups. For example, the first group could describe physical
road characteristics (e.g. the number of lanes: one lane, two lane, etc.), the second group could describe
traffic patterns (e.g. the average volume per day: ten vehicles, a hundred vehicles, etc.), the third group
could describe visibility (e.g. the amount of street lighting: no street lighting, street lighting, etc.), and so on.
Two roads, i1 and i2, are of the same type, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, if jk[i1] = jk[i2] for all k. The multivariate case
can now be written:
Xi ∼ Poisson(µi) (1)
µi = exp(θ +
K∑
k=1
αkjk[i])
αkjk ∼ Normal(0, σk)
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The log-rate parameter for the ith road is now the sum of K subtype parameters, α1j1[i]+, . . . ,+α
K
jK [i], and
the kth subtype parameter, αkjk , is thought exchangeable within group k and modeled i.i.d. Normal(θk, σk).
Note the θk are not identified, and only the sum, θ =
∑
k θk, is included in the model above.
In the typical traffic safety study, the covariates that describe each subtype are collected for all roads regardless
of the outcome, or control roads are carefully chosen for comparison. Neither designs are possible when
evaluating Vision Zero due to the immense scope of these strategies. Prospective samples are available for
only a minority of roads, and they are unlikely to contain enough fatalities to describe the potentially complex
relationships between the subtype groups and the fatality rate. These relationships are better studied using
retrospective data, collected in the event of a fatality on a road. Estimates obtained from retrospective data
can then be weighted back to a Vision Zero city using a prospective sample.
The notation is augmented again to reflect these circumstances. Let Xi denote the number of fatalities on
road i ∈ {1, . . . , I ′}. Suppose the roads are arranged in decreasing order of fatalities so that the first I < I ′
roads had at least one fatality in the before period and traffic safety experts are only able to classify these
roads into one of jk ∈ {1, . . . , Jk} subtypes for each of the k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} groups.
The typical number of fatalities on the first I roads, µi for i ≤ I, is estimable from the hierarchical model using
the zero-truncated Poisson likelihood, Poisson+(µi) = µ
x
i
(exp (µi)−1)x! , so that equation (1) simply becomes:
Xi ∼ Poisson+(µi)
Values or distributions can be chosen for the hyperparameters, and statistical software can simulate S samples
from the posterior distribution of the parameters. After model validation, µi can be characterized by the
quantiles of µˆi(s) or by 1S
∑S
s=1 µˆi(s), where µˆi(s) is the sth simulation of the posterior distribution of µi.
The former corresponds to uncertainty intervals, and the latter corresponds to the posterior mean used in
Subsection 3.1.
However, µi cannot be reliably estimated reliably for the remaining I ′ − I roads with no fatalities and
therefore unobserved subtypes. These roads cannot be ignored. While the first I roads likely constitute
the most dangerous roads in a city and the remaining I ′ − I roads likely have low fatality rates, I ′ − I will
be much larger than I for most cities. It is possible the latter contributes more to the expected number of
fatalities in the before period. That is,
∑I′
i=I+1 µi 
∑I
i=1 µi.
The summand of
∑I
i=1 µi is reweighted to represent the population of roads before the Vision Zero strategy.
Let 1(i ≤ I) denote whether the ith road was observed in the retrospective data. Note that ∑Ii=1 µi =∑I′
i=1 1(i ≤ I)µi and E(1(i ≤ I)) = P (Xi > 0), where E is taken over hypothetical replications of the before
period. Inverse probability weights, 1P (Xi>0) , can be estimated from a prospective sample to ensure the
weighted sum,
∑I
i=1
µi
P (Xi>0) , is representative of all roads in a city:
E
I∑
i=1
µi
P (Xi > 0)
= E
I′∑
i=1
µi1(i ≤ I)
P (Xi > 0)
=
I′∑
i=1
µiE(1(i ≤ I))
P (Xi > 0)
=
I′∑
i=1
µiP (Xi > 0)
P (Xi > 0)
=
I′∑
i=1
µi
The combination of hierarchical Bayes and reweighting is common in the model-based inference of surveys.
For example, see multilevel regression and poststratification (Gelman and Little 1997, Gelman and Hill 2006,
Si, Pillai and Gelman 2015). The retrospective data can be viewed as a convenience survey that oversamples
roads with covariates predictive of fatalities. The prospective sample readjusts the estimates to reflect the
desired population of roads. For evaluating Vision Zero strategies, the population of interest is the set of
selected roads in a city.
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4. Fitting the Hierarchical Bayes Model to Traffic Safety Data from the Before
Period
Section 3 motivates a general hierarchical Bayes model that describes fatalities using covariates informative of
selection into a Vision Zero strategy. The model is a compromise between the before-after comparison, which
incorrectly ignores the fatalities on the unselected roads, and the nonparametric empirical Bayes adjustment,
which incorrectly compares the fatalities on the unselected roads directly with the selected roads. The
hierarchical Bayes model provides the correct adjustment if it properly accounts for the covariates informative
of selection. The remaining determinants of fatalities would balance across the selected and unselected roads,
enabling a fair comparison and a representative estimate of the fatality rate in the before period.
Yet it is not clear how to properly account for the covariates informative of selection from the data alone.
The general hierarchical Bayes model described in Subsection 3.2 allows outside information to determine
how information is pooled across roads, while the strength of the pooling is determined by the data. This
Section highlights the specific considerations that arise when fitting the model to police reports from the
twelve major American cities that have declared Vision Zero policies. The model could be fit with data from
a variety of other sources, and the additional complications that may arise are discussed in Section 5.
The data presented in this subsection is obtained primarily from two National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration sources: the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System
(GES) and the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). GES is a nationally representative probability
sample selected from the more than five million police-reported crashes that occur annually. It is collected
prospectively and measures a large number of covariates detailing the road, vehicle and persons involved.
The prospective nature of the dataset is useful for drawing conclusions representative of the unobserved
population. The drawback is that the sample size is too small to reliably estimate the fatality rate for each
road type. Key geographic information is also missing.
FARS is a retrospective census of fatalities containing a large number of covariates in common with GES.
Unlike GES, however, FARS includes geographic coordinates that permit the estimation of the traffic and
pedestrian density. Subsections 4.1 describes the combination of FARS with additional data using these
coordinates. A large amount of information is obtained for each road, producing sparsity and multicolinearity
among some covariates and requiring additional regularization for interpretability. Subsection 4.2 demonstrates
model interpretation and presents select findings from the fitted model. ANOVA plots, described in Gelman
(2005), provide a graphical representation of variable importance. Subsection 4.3 discusses the weighting of
the results with the GES and applies them to the real world example introduced in Subsection 2.2.
4.1 The Combination of Multiple Datasets Results in Sparsity and Multicolinearity Among
the Covariates
Several datasets are combined with FARS to create the complete, retrospective dataset used in this analysis.
Missing New York City speed limit data in FARS is imputed from a NYC DOT shapefile of posted speed
limits. The pedestrian population on each road is estimated as recommended by the Census Bureau using
the Census Tract Flows (TPP) and the Census Planning Database (PDB). Average annual daily traffic is
estimated from the Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS).
The combined dataset contains 2,404 fatalities as determined by the KABCO scale. It includes every
pedestrian death in the twelve major American cities with Vision Zero policies between 2010 and 2015 for
which there was no missing covariate information that could be reliably estimated with additional resources.
Missing fatalities are assumed to result from unintentional oversight and considered missing at random. The
year 2009 is dropped because of compatibility issues between GES and FARS, and the year 2015 is withheld
for model validation.
The nearly twenty-five hundred observations in the dataset are relatively small compared to the numerous
ways roads can differ. The retrospective dataset contains the following eight covariate groups describing the
road on which the fatality took place: the weather and surface condition (COND), the city (CITY), the
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year (YEAR), the posted speed limit (SLIM), the presence of various signs or signals (SIGN), the time and
lighting (LGHT), the physical road characteristics or built environment (BLTE) and the annual average
traffic density (TFFC). However, these eight covariates are themselves batches of hundreds of subtypes that
determine the fatality rate and potentially inform selection into a Vision Zero strategy. Table 2 displays the
first six observations of the dataset where numbers denote the various qualitative subtype categories. One
quantitative variable, the number of pedestrians exposed to the road (EXPR), is also displayed.
The decision to combine covariates in this way came from conversations with experts, who indicated that
the subtypes in a group represent similar amounts of information about a road a priori. For example, CITY
denotes which of the twelve cities contains the road, and it is expected the contribution of the fatality rate
due to the city containing the road to vary systematically about the average city level. Interactions between
groups is also informative, but the same conversations suggested that their importance is second order.
Table 3 shows the number of observations with the most common subtypes for each covariate grouping. A few
groupings possess a large number of subtypes. COND, LGHT and BLTE have 25, 36 and 111 respectively,
and most of these are well represented. For example, New York City (12) had around 800 roads, and many
roads are observed in weather condition 2 (clear weather, dry road surface). But while the marginal counts of
each subtype can be large, the number of observations for any specific road type is small, where road type
refers to the interaction of subtypes as defined in Subsection 3.3.
Table 2: Example Observations of Dataset
COND CITY YEAR SLIM SIGN LGHT BLTE TFFC EXPR
2 1 1 6 1 10 4 1 256.52
2 1 1 6 1 29 4 1 382.92
2 1 1 6 13 29 6 1 859.79
2 1 1 6 3 8 6 1 3117.68
2 1 1 6 1 8 9 1 3286.61
2 1 1 6 1 14 18 1 193.75
Table 3: Summary of Covariate Groups
COND CITY YEAR SLIM SIGN LGHT BLTE TFFC
2 :1708 12 :721 1:354 7 :768 1 :1423 21 :335 6 :530 1: 55
23 : 223 8 :505 2:356 8 :523 4 : 397 8 :298 18 :405 2:1332
9 : 202 6 :239 3:408 6 :351 3 : 313 34 :223 14 :147 3: 769
24 : 54 9 :159 4:406 10 :150 7 : 69 29 :217 7 :114 4: 120
3 : 27 3 :110 5:369 14 :127 10 : 23 1 :189 8 :103 NA
18 : 12 10 :101 6:383 9 :127 2 : 18 25 :135 13 : 93 NA
(Other): 50 (Other):441 NA (Other):230 (Other): 33 (Other):879 (Other):884 NA
Low counts within combinations of subtypes can lead to interpretability issues if the covariate groups become
highly associated. Association of the eight covariate groups is summarized using Cramer’s V statistic in
Figure 3. No two groups, aside from city and traffic density, are found to be highly associated. It was decided
to replace TFFC with the covariate ROUT, indicating the road’s major function (e.g. whether the road
segment is a local road, highway, etc).
To contrast Figure 3, association of three-way interactions between select covariate groups is displayed in
Figure 4. The high associations indicate that interactions must either be included judiciously in the model or
heavily regularized. Judicious inclusion may better promote interpretability. However experts disagree on
which variables are most important and their exact relationship with each other. It was decided to include all
two-way interactions in the model, and their effects are penalized more strongly than the marginal effects.
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Weak association between most of the covariate groups
Figure 3: This figure exhibits the marginal association of the eight covariate groups using Cramer’s V statistic.
A value of 0 indicates no association, and a value of 1 indicates complete association. From this figure it is
observed that nearly all of the covariates are moderately associated, aside from city and traffic density.
Strong association between a large number of three-way interactions of covariate groups
Figure 4: This figure exhibits the marginal association of select interactions between covariate groups using
Cramer’s V statistic. A value of 0 indicates no association, and a value of 1 indicates complete association.
From this figure it is observed that all of the interactions are strongly or completely associated.
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4.2 Results from the Hierarchical Bayes Approach are Consistent with Previous Vision Zero
Findings
Subsection 4.1 describes the covariates that inform selection into a Vision Zero strategy. These covariates
partition the roads observed in the before period into J types. Since many factors inform selection, J is large.
However, road types with common covariates are thought to have similar fatality rates. The covariates are
arranged into K groups of subtypes, chosen to reflect similar information about each road.
Let Xi denote the number of fatalities on the ith road, and let j[i] denote the type of the ith road. As
in Subsection 3.2, j[i1] = j[i2] for any two roads, i1 and i2, if they have all subtypes in common. That is,
jk[i1] = jk[i2] for all K groupings.
It is computationally convenient—and without loss of information—to aggregate the number of fatalities
across roads of the same type. The offset term, EXPR, ensures the aggregates remain comparable. Let
Yj =
∑
i:j′[i]=j Xi denote the total number of fatalities on all roads of type j, and let EXPRj denote the total
number of pedestrians exposed to all roads of type j. The notation jk[j] refers to the subtype, jk, of the kth
group for all roads of type j. For example, the first group of road subtypes is the speed limit, and all roads of
the first type have jSLIM[j] = j1[j] = “road type j has a 30 mph limit”. Note the kth group can be denoted
by either a four letter code (e.g. SLIM) or a number (e.g. 1).
When aggregated, the hierarchical Bayes model outlined in Subsection 3.2 describes a high dimensional
contingency table and is written:
Yj ∼ Poisson+(µj)
µj = exp(θ + αSLIMj1[j] + α
CITY
j2[j] + α
YEAR
j3[j] + α
COND
j4[j]
+ αSIGNj5[j] + α
LGHT
j6[j] + α
BLTE
j7[j] + α
ROUT
j8[j]
+ βSLIM x CITYj9[j] + β
SLIM x COND
j10[j] +, . . . ,+β
BLTE x ROUT
j36[j]
+ j + ρ · log(EXPRj))
αkjk ∼ Normal(0, σk)
βljl ∼ Normal(0, σl)
σl < σk
j ∼ Normal(0, σ)
All
(8
2
)
interactions between the covariates in Table 2, excluding EXPR, are included in the model, although
only three are written out above. The standard deviation of the interaction parameters are constrained to be
a fraction of the standard deviation of the main effects, and as a result the interactions each explain less
variation than the marginals. The specification of this model is complete with an error term,  (referred to as
“cell” error), and diffuse normal priors are placed on µ, ρ, σk, σl and σ, as recommended by the Stan Prior
Choice Wiki.
A large number of samples are drawn from the posterior distribution of the parameters given the data,
excluding all fatalities in 2015, which are removed from the dataset for validation. RStan (Stan Development
Team 2016) is used to run four chains of two thousand iterations each. This yields four thousand posterior
draws after discarding the first thousand warm-up iterations of each chain. The Stan code is provided in the
Appendix.
In the Stan generated quantities block, the finite sample standard deviations of each covariate group is
calculated (Gelman 2005). The number of fatalities of each road type in the dataset in the year 2015 is also
predicted for the purpose of checking the validity of the posterior distribution. An example predictive check
is displayed in Figure 5 for New York City. Posterior predictions of the number of fatalities in the held out
test set (the histogram) covers the number actually observed (the dashed line), providing confidence in the
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before-after adjustment computed in Subsection 4.3. Roughly twelve percent of simulated predictions exceed
the number of fatalities observed in 2015.
Predictions of the number of New York City fatalities in 2015 covers the number actually observed
Figure 5: This figure exhibits two thousand posterior predictions of the number of pedestrian fatalities in
New York City in the held out year 2015 for all road segments that experienced a fatality between 2010 and
2014. The actual number of fatalities observed in 2015 is represented by the dotted line. The proportion of
predictions exceeding the number of fatalities observed is twelve percent.
Many results are consistent with the experience of traffic safety stakeholders. This consistency also adds
confidence in the before-after adjustments. Figures 6 displays an Analysis of Variance using the inner 50 and
90 percent intervals of the finite sample standard deviations calculated in the generative quantities block.
The standard deviations are interpreted as a measure of variable group importance. The fat line represents
the inner 50 percent range, and the thin line represents the inner 90 percent range. Throughout this analysis,
the uncertainty intervals are interpreted as corresponding to the likely and plausible locations respectively.
The Analysis of Variance indicates that the city (CITY) and the built environment (BLTE) explain a large
proportion of variation in fatalities as expected. However, nearly as important is weather and surface condition
(COND) and time of day and lighting (LGHT). Conversations revealed these variables capture the varying
use of roads each day (e.g. commuting, tourism, dinner, nightlife, etc.). There is relatively less variation of
the fatality rate within type (cell) and years (YEAR) suggesting that, through the other covariates, major
sources of variation have been accounted for within subtype groups and between the same subtype groups
across years.
The individual effects were also interpretable. For example, Figure 7 shows the largest LGHT effects, which
indicate that the time period of 4:00 pm - 10:00 pm and the weekend contain a disproportionate amount
of information about fatalities. Conversations revealed that this time period had also been identified by
researchers as important, for example by the New York City Vision Zero committee (Taskforce 2017).
Other results were suspected by experts but had not been quantified and the magnitude of the effects were
surprising. For example, Figure 8 shows that a lot of the city variation originates from two cities: Los
Angeles and New York City. New York City has an average effect of around 1, which is roughly 2.7 times the
average city. Meanwhile, Washington D.C. has an average effect of around -.25, which is roughly 78 percent
of the average city. Boston was identified in conversation as a city with an abnormally large fatality rate.
However, Boston does not appear at relatively high risk after adjusting for covariates like the weather and
built environment.
Select interaction effects between CITY and COND are displayed in Figure 9. There is evidence of variation
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An Analysis of Variance provides a measure of group importance
Figure 6: In this figure, lines correspond to inner 50 and 90 percent intervals for the finite-population standard
deviations of the coefficients of each group of covariates. Select interactions are also included in the Figure.
across these categories. For example, weekends from 10 am to 3 pm in New York City and cloudy days in
San Diego are disproportionately represented in the data. These interactions could reflect city-specific trends,
such as the popularity of brunch or the quick advancement of dense fog. While there is too much uncertainty
to speculate over the plausibility of these specific explanations, plots of the interactions, such as in Figure 9,
can be used to generate hypotheses that are evaluated in future studies.
4.3 The Hierarchical Bayes Approach Provides a Realistic Adjustment for Selection Bias
This subsection concludes the discussion of selection bias in the before-after comparison of New York City’s
Vision Zero road prioritization strategy. Sections 2 and 3 present two different estimates for the number
of pedestrian fatalities prevented as a result of the strategy. A before-after comparison gives a 27 percent
decline in fatalities, while adjustment with Robbins’ Formula gives a 38 percent increase. However, both
estimates are unrealistic because selected roads were chosen based on the number of fatalities in the before
period, and both estimates made unreasonable assumptions about the selection process.
The before-after comparison assumed the selected roads had a representative number of fatalities in the
before period. This was unreasonable because New York City deliberately used the number of fatalities to
inform the selection process. Conversely, adjustment with Robbins’ formula assumed all roads were eligible
for selection, and this was unreasonable because additional information, such as the function of the road,
presumably governed its eligibility for selection. Both estimates are extreme, and the actual effect likely
resides somewhere in the middle. A better estimate could be achieved using additional information governing
selection eligibility to compute a different adjustment for each road type.
The importance of determining the type of each road can be seen in Figure 10, which displays the expected
number of fatalities for all New York City segment types fit with the model described in Subsection 4.2.
These densities are not weighted by the number of road segments represented by each type and therefore
reflect only the New York City road segments on which there was at least one fatality between 2010 and 2013.
The density is over point estimates, and does not reflect uncertainty in the expected number of fatalities.
A large amount of separation between the road types predictive of fatalities on priority and non priority
road segments is observed. The separation suggests that priority locations do in fact possess covariates more
predictive of fatalities than non priority locations and thus have higher expected fatality rates than estimated
17
Majority of variation in lighting is explained by roads during dawn, dusk or dark and the weekend
Figure 7: This figure exhibits inner 50 and 90 percent intervals for the largest time of day and lighting effects.
Effects are interpreted as the log of the expected multiplicative increase in the fatality rate holding all else
constant.
Majority of variation in cities explained by New York and Los Angeles
Figure 8: This figure exhibits inner 50 and 90 percent intervals for city effects. Effects are interpreted as the
log of the expected multiplicative increase in the fatality rate holding all else constant.
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Within city patterns emerge although relatively little variation explained by condition, city interaction
Figure 9: This figure exhibits inner 50 and 90 percent intervals for the largest city and weather and surface
condition effects. Effects are interpreted as the log of the expected multiplicative increase in the fatality rate
holding all else constant.
by Robbins’ formula in Table 1. This explains why adjustment by Robbins’ formula gave an increase in the
number of fatalities and not the decrease indicated in the traffic safety literature.
To compute the hierarchical Bayes adjustment for New York City’s Vision Zero strategy, samples from the
model described in Subsection 4.2 are combined with the GES sampling weights to calculate the expected
number of fatalities on priority road segments over the 2010-2013 before period as described in Subsection
3.2. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} denote a New York City priority road segment observed in the combined, retrospective
dataset of Subsection 4.1, and j[i] the corresponding road type, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Similarly, let i′ ∈ {1, . . . , I ′}
denote a report in GES on a road of the same type so that j[i] = j[i′]. That is, {i′ : j[i′] = j[i]} is the set of
all GES reports occurring under similar conditions as the fatality on road i. As in Subsection 3.2, suppose
the GES reports are arranged in decreasing order of fatalities so that the first I ′f < I ′ reports resulted in at
least one fatality. The probability of a fatality is estimated from the GES as:
Pˆ (Xi > 0) =
∑
i′:j[i′]=j[i]
wti′1(i′ ≤ I ′f ) + 1
wti′ + 1
The wti are computed from the sampling design as follows. Nationally representative weights are constructed
in GES by its three stage, stratified sampling design: 1wn
i′
= P (PAR | PJ)P (PJ | PSU)P (PSU), where PAR is
the event that a Police Accident Report is sampled as observation i, PJ is the event that the Police Jurisdiction
containing the PAR is sampled and PSU is the event that the Primary Sampling Unit containing the PJ is
sampled. The target population is a combination of police jurisdictions, and its weight, wti , is obtained after
multiplying the nationally representative weights, wni′ , by the probability a sampled report would be in a PJ
in the target population as described in the GES documentation (Shelton 1991). Additive smoothing—the
addition of 1 to the numerator and denominator—ensures no road is assigned a zero probability of a fatality.
Estimates of the expected number of fatalities on priority and non priority road segments, had the Vision Zero
strategy never been implemented, are computed for the three largest Boroughs in New York City: Brooklyn,
Manhattan and Queens and displayed in Figure 11. The estimates were computed using the weights described
above in the manner outlined at the end of Subsection 3.2. First, the expected number of fatalities for each
road segment observed in the retrospective data was determined from the fitted model described in Subsection
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4.2. Then, the weighted average was taken using the inverse probability of inclusion as determined by the
above formula. Estimates are only computed for Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens, and not Staten Island
and the Bronx, because the latter two Boroughs were not actually sampled in the GES. However, since all
boroughs were eligible to be sampled, the estimates can be scaled to reflect the entire City.
In Figure 11, black lines represent inner fifty and ninety percent intervals for the expected number of fatalities
as determined using the posterior simulations of the fitted model as described in Subsection 4.2. The red
lines represent the average number of observed fatalities from 2009-2013 and the blue lines represent the
number of observed fatalities in 2016. The regression to the mean effect is apparent in the Figure: for both
priority and non priority road segments, the number of fatalities after Vision Zero moves towards the average
number predicted from the model. Notice the blue line for non priority roads is located roughly between the
black lines, and therefore the model is consistent with the number of fatalities in the after period. By this
measure, the model accounts for the selection effect. However, the blue line for priority roads is lower than
what was expected from the model, and this discrepancy is interpreted as reflecting the number of fatalities
prevented by the implementation of Vision Zero strategy.
There may be too much uncertainty to quantify the exact number of fatalities prevented by Vision Zero to
the satisfaction of policymakers. The fifty percent uncertainty interval in Figure 16 indicates that there was
an average reduction in fatalities between fifteen and thirty-one percent, and the ninety percent uncertainty
interval indicates an average reduction anywhere between one and forty percent. At the ninety-five percent
uncertainty level, it is impossible to completely rule out that the policy prevented no fatalities or that it
reduced fatalities to the maximal attainable reduction suggested in Subsection 2.2.
More nuanced statements can be evaluated using the posterior distribution. For example, the before-after
comparison, which suggested a 27 percent reduction on priority roads in New York City (or for Brooklyn,
Manhattan and Queens, a 30 percent decline), underestimates the actual number of fatalities prevented in
twenty-five percent of posterior simulations. That is, after looking at the data, the model gives a seventy-five
percent chance the expected number of fatalities prevented is as low or lower than the amount suggested by
the before-after comparison. Conversely, it is estimated that there is a four percent chance that the policy
led to no change or an increase in fatalities.
The median reduction for New York City is roughly 18 percent, two-thirds the size of the before-after
comparison. This estimate is considered a realistic summary of the effect size of the Vision Zero strategy
because the median increase on the non priority roads is negligible. It is also three-quarters of the 24 percent
reduction predicted by Rosén and Sander (2009) and Goodwin et al. (2010) when posted speed limits are
enforced commensurately.
5. Discussion
Over the past decade, major American cities have implemented Vision Zero strategies aimed at preventing
pedestrian fatalities. The policy question now facing cities is to what extent these strategies have actually
prevented fatalities. This paper made two main points regarding the before-after comparisons commonly
used to answer this question.
First, it demonstrated how selection bias produces before-after comparisons that exaggerate the effect of a
Vision Zero strategy. A theoretical explanation of this exaggeration was provided, followed by a real world
example identifying selection bias in a before-after comparison used to evaluate New York City’s Vision Zero
road prioritization strategy. As predicted by theory, the before-after comparison overestimated the effect
anticipated by the traffic safety literature and could not explain a massive increase in fatalities on the roads
not selected for the strategy.
Second, this paper demonstrated how a hierarchical Bayes adjustment provides a more realistic estimate.
This adjustment augmented a simpler nonparametric empirical Bayes analysis, which proved unrealistic
when applied to the New York City data. Traffic safety experts interpreted the proposed hierarchical Bayes
adjustment, and when it was applied to the same data, it produced an estimate consistent with the traffic
safety literature—and roughly two-thirds the size of the unadjusted before-after comparison. It also corrected
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Little overlap in the number of expected fatalities on priority and non priority road types
Figure 10: This figure exhibits the variation in the estimated expected number of fatalities across different
road types in New York City on which there was a fatality between 2010 and 2013. Priority road types have
been shaded red while nonpriority road types have been shaded blue.
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Selection bias correction using the proposed model
Figure 11: This figure exhibits the expected number of fatalities in the New York City Boroughs of Brooklyn,
Manhattan and Queens. The red lines mark the average number of fatalities observed on priority and
nonpriority road segments over the 2009-2013 before period. The black lines represent 50 and 95 percent
uncertainty intervals of the expected number of fatalities in the before period from the Hierarchical Bayes
model. The blue lines mark the observed number of fatalities in 2016.
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the statistical artifact present in the unadjusted before-after comparison in which a massive increase in
fatalities was observed on the roads not selected for the strategy.
This paper was streamlined in order to make these two points most effectively. It deliberately overlooked
some potential sources of confounding and uncertainty. Yet despite this streamlining, significant effort was
still required to identify and correct selection bias in a before-after comparison that is popular precisely
because it is simple. Moreover, the estimate contains a substantial amount of uncertainty.
Some might conclude the effort of adjustment is not worth the reward and that it is easier to avoid selection
bias in the first place. For example, policymakers might compute a before-after comparison on all roads in a
city, regardless of whether they were selected for the strategy. While this may avoid selection bias, it does not
answer the question to what extent a Vision Zero strategy was effective on the selected roads, and it cannot
be used to determine whether the strategy should be continued in future years or expanded to additional
roads.
Answering the policy question of interest may mean embracing uncertainty. More accurate measurements,
such as better police records, might not be feasible, and additional data sources can introduce more uncertainty
than they reduce. For example, the exposure variable was constructed from the Census tract-level population
to represent the number of pedestrians eligible for a fatality. Although admittedly broad, a more accurate
count of pedestrians on the street may not provide a better measure of the true exposure if dangerous
behavior, such as j-walking or being distracted, is not evenly distributed among the pedestrian population.
Furthermore, a count from observational or administrative data may introduce confounding if the collection
process differs substantially over space or time.
Future work could better quantify uncertainty in the proposed adjustment. This analysis may have understated
uncertainty because the covariates and probability weights described in Sections 3 and 4 were treated as fixed
constants. However, traffic safety data is prone to measurement error and missingness may be informative.
Jointly modeling these quantities in the hierarchical Bayes model would produce an even more realistic
adjustment. In addition to modeling the probability weights, a more robust weighting strategy could be
employed. Si, Pillai and Gelman (2015) discuss the advantages of Bayesian nonparametric weights in
comparison to the inverse probability weights used in this analysis.
The primary concern of this paper was to compute a point estimate for the number of fatalities prevented
as a result of implementing a Vision Zero strategy, including both the countermeasures deployed and all
subsequent changes that typically occur in cities. No attempt was made to separate a countermeasures’ direct
impact from its context or execution. It did not adjust for the actual change in traffic conditions, human
behavior or other intervening factors.
This point is worth stressing due to the differing positions on what is meant by a “causal effect”. For example,
taken literally, the effect of lowering the posted speed limit could refer only to the consequence of legislatures
putting words on a page and have no meaningful impact on fatalities in and of itself. Drivers would have to
be educated about the law, or the law would have to include provisions on redesigns and enforcement. If
taken mechanistically, the effect of lowering the posted speed limit could refer to the physical state of the
road. Vehicles traveling at a lower speed may be able to better maneuver and collide with less force. The
effect then pertains to vehicles that comply perfectly with the reduced limit. In this paper, the effect of a
countermeasure, such as lowering the posted speed limit, referred to the policy change and all subsequent
actions to educate drivers and enforce it with road redesigns, traffic tickets and other countermeasures.
Policymakers should consider multiple effects of Vision Zero policy. In theory, Vision Zero differs substantially
from the traditional approach to traffic safety policy, and future work may seek to understand how drivers
change their behavior as a result of specific policies. For example, traditional traffic safety improvements
often widen roads and crosswalks to aid evasive maneuvers that reduce collisions, while Vision Zero advocates
improvements that narrow them, much like the road “diets” of Goodwin et al. (2010), to force drivers to
decrease their vehicle speed. Consequently, reducing fatalities under the Vision Zero approach may actually
increase the number of collisions. For details see Johansson (2009).
In considering these additional effects, a variety of methodological hurdles will come to light. Selection bias is
just one of a litany of statistical issues that commonly arise in the estimation of causal effects, along with
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interference, temporal confounding and collision bias. Readers are referred to Hauer (2005) and Davis (2000)
for a general discussion of the methodological challenges that arise in the evaluation of traffic safety policy.
This paper makes no policy recommendations. Triage may be the most sensible way to implement a Vision Zero
strategy, but any subsequent evaluation must be performed with care. The U.S. Department of Transportation
directs its offices to assign human life a value of roughly ten million dollars when conducting analysis that
carries implications for public safety (Transportation 2016). The investment of billions of dollars over the
lifetime of a strategy would then be considered effective if it were to save hundreds of lives. When making
these and similar comparisons, it is important for policymakers to understand how to identify and adjust for
selection bias. Failure can make an ineffective policy appear effective when perhaps a different strategy could
prevent a greater number of fatalities or at a significantly reduced cost.
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8. Appendix
The following Stan Code was used in Subsection 4.2 (Stan Development Team 2016).
functions {
int poisson_log_trunc_rng(real log_rate) {
int draw;
draw = poisson_log_rng(log_rate);
while (draw == 0)
draw = poisson_log_rng(log_rate);
return draw;
}
}
data {
int<lower=1> N_train;
int<lower=1> N;
int<lower=1> G;
int<lower=3> J[G];
int ints[N,G];
vector[N] EXPR;
int count[N];
int<lower=1> n_main;
int<lower=1> n_inter;
}
transformed data {
vector[N] offset = log(EXPR);
int count_train[N_train] = count[1:N_train];
int n_vars = G + 1;
}
parameters {
real offset_e;
vector[J[1]] eta_1;
vector[J[2] - 1] eta_2;
real nyc_e;
vector[J[3]] eta_3;
vector[J[4]] eta_4;
vector[J[5]] eta_5;
vector[J[6]] eta_6;
vector[J[7]] eta_7;
vector[J[8]] eta_8;
vector[J[9]] eta_9;
vector[J[10]] eta_10;
vector[J[11]] eta_11;
vector[J[12]] eta_12;
vector[J[13]] eta_13;
vector[J[14]] eta_14;
vector[J[15]] eta_15;
vector[J[16]] eta_16;
vector[J[17]] eta_17;
vector[J[18]] eta_18;
vector[J[19]] eta_19;
vector[J[20]] eta_20;
vector[J[21]] eta_21;
vector[J[22]] eta_22;
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vector[J[23]] eta_23;
vector[J[24]] eta_24;
vector[J[25]] eta_25;
vector[J[26]] eta_26;
vector[J[27]] eta_27;
vector[J[28]] eta_28;
vector[J[29]] eta_29;
vector[J[30]] eta_30;
vector[J[31]] eta_31;
vector[J[32]] eta_32;
vector[J[33]] eta_33;
vector[J[34]] eta_34;
vector[J[35]] eta_35;
vector[J[36]] eta_36;
vector[N_train] cell_eta;
vector[n_main] eta_main;
vector[n_inter] eta_inter;
real<lower=0> sigma_sigma_main;
real<lower=0> sigma_sigma_inter;
real<lower=0> sigma_cell;
real tau_main;
real tau_inter;
real mu;
}
transformed parameters {
vector[J[1]] e_1;
vector[J[2]] e_2;
vector[J[3]] e_3;
vector[J[4]] e_4;
vector[J[5]] e_5;
vector[J[6]] e_6;
vector[J[7]] e_7;
vector[J[8]] e_8;
vector[J[9]] e_9;
vector[J[10]] e_10;
vector[J[11]] e_11;
vector[J[12]] e_12;
vector[J[13]] e_13;
vector[J[14]] e_14;
vector[J[15]] e_15;
vector[J[16]] e_16;
vector[J[17]] e_17;
vector[J[18]] e_18;
vector[J[19]] e_19;
vector[J[20]] e_20;
vector[J[21]] e_21;
vector[J[22]] e_22;
vector[J[23]] e_23;
vector[J[24]] e_24;
vector[J[25]] e_25;
vector[J[26]] e_26;
vector[J[27]] e_27;
vector[J[28]] e_28;
vector[J[29]] e_29;
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vector[J[30]] e_30;
vector[J[31]] e_31;
vector[J[32]] e_32;
vector[J[33]] e_33;
vector[J[34]] e_34;
vector[J[35]] e_35;
vector[J[36]] e_36;
vector[n_vars] sds;
vector[N_train] cell_e;
vector[N_train] mu_indiv;
vector[n_inter] sigma_inter;
vector[n_main] sigma_main;
sigma_main = exp(-1 + 0.5 * tau_main + 0.3 * sigma_sigma_main * eta_main);
sigma_inter = exp(-2 + 0.5 * tau_inter + 0.3 * sigma_sigma_inter * eta_inter);
sds[1:n_main] = sigma_main;
sds[(n_main + 1):(n_inter + n_main)] = sigma_inter;
sds[n_vars] = 0.3 * sigma_cell;
e_1 = sds[1] * eta_1;
e_2[1:(J[2] - 1)] = sds[2] * eta_2;
e_2[J[2]] = nyc_e;
e_3 = sds[3] * eta_3;
e_4 = sds[4] * eta_4;
e_5 = sds[5] * eta_5;
e_6 = sds[6] * eta_6;
e_7 = sds[7] * eta_7;
e_8 = sds[8] * eta_8;
e_9 = sds[9] * eta_9;
e_10 = sds[10] * eta_10;
e_11 = sds[11] * eta_11;
e_12 = sds[12] * eta_12;
e_13 = sds[13] * eta_13;
e_14 = sds[14] * eta_14;
e_15 = sds[15] * eta_15;
e_16 = sds[16] * eta_16;
e_17 = sds[17] * eta_17;
e_18 = sds[18] * eta_18;
e_19 = sds[19] * eta_19;
e_20 = sds[20] * eta_20;
e_21 = sds[21] * eta_21;
e_22 = sds[22] * eta_22;
e_23 = sds[23] * eta_23;
e_24 = sds[24] * eta_24;
e_25 = sds[25] * eta_25;
e_26 = sds[26] * eta_26;
e_27 = sds[27] * eta_27;
e_28 = sds[28] * eta_28;
e_29 = sds[29] * eta_29;
e_30 = sds[30] * eta_30;
e_31 = sds[31] * eta_31;
e_32 = sds[32] * eta_32;
e_33 = sds[33] * eta_33;
e_34 = sds[34] * eta_34;
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e_35 = sds[35] * eta_35;
e_36 = sds[36] * eta_36;
cell_e = sds[G+1] * cell_eta;
for (n in 1:N_train)
mu_indiv[n] = mu + offset_e * offset[n]
+ e_1[ints[n,1]]
+ e_2[ints[n,2]]
+ e_3[ints[n,3]]
+ e_4[ints[n,4]]
+ e_5[ints[n,5]]
+ e_6[ints[n,6]]
+ e_7[ints[n,7]]
+ e_8[ints[n,8]]
+ e_9[ints[n,9]]
+ e_10[ints[n,10]]
+ e_11[ints[n,11]]
+ e_12[ints[n,12]]
+ e_13[ints[n,13]]
+ e_14[ints[n,14]]
+ e_15[ints[n,15]]
+ e_16[ints[n,16]]
+ e_17[ints[n,17]]
+ e_18[ints[n,18]]
+ e_19[ints[n,19]]
+ e_20[ints[n,20]]
+ e_21[ints[n,21]]
+ e_22[ints[n,22]]
+ e_23[ints[n,23]]
+ e_24[ints[n,24]]
+ e_25[ints[n,25]]
+ e_26[ints[n,26]]
+ e_27[ints[n,27]]
+ e_28[ints[n,28]]
+ e_29[ints[n,29]]
+ e_30[ints[n,30]]
+ e_31[ints[n,31]]
+ e_32[ints[n,32]]
+ e_33[ints[n,33]]
+ e_34[ints[n,34]]
+ e_35[ints[n,35]]
+ e_36[ints[n,36]]
+ cell_e[n];
}
model {
eta_1 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_2 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_3 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_4 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_5 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_6 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_7 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_8 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_9 ~ normal(0, 1);
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eta_10 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_11 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_12 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_13 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_14 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_15 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_16 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_17 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_18 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_19 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_20 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_21 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_22 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_23 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_24 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_25 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_26 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_27 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_28 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_29 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_30 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_31 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_32 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_33 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_34 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_35 ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_36 ~ normal(0, 1);
cell_eta ~ normal(0, 1);
offset_e ~ normal(0, 1);
mu ~ normal(-10,3);
nyc_e ~ normal(0, 2);
sigma_sigma_inter ~ normal(0, 1);
sigma_sigma_main ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_inter ~ normal(0, 1);
eta_main ~ normal(0, 1);
tau_inter ~ normal(0, 1);
tau_main ~ normal(0, 1);
sigma_cell ~ normal(0, 1);
for (n in 1:N_train)
target += -log1m_exp(-exp(mu_indiv[n])) + poisson_log_lpmf(count_train[n] | mu_indiv[n]);
}
generated quantities {
real sd_1;
real sd_2;
real sd_3;
real sd_4;
real sd_5;
real sd_6;
real sd_7;
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real sd_8;
real sd_9;
real sd_10;
real sd_11;
real sd_12;
real sd_13;
real sd_14;
real sd_15;
real sd_16;
real sd_17;
31
